In RFID system a tag is attached to an object which might own by a number of owners during its life time. This requires the RFID system to transfer ownership of the tag to its new owner. The ownership transfer has to protect privacy of current and new owner. Many ownership tag ownership transfer exists in the literature, however, most of them are impractical or insecure to implement on current passive RFID tags. We are proposing a timer based ownership transfer protocol for closed loop RFID systems. The proposal in this paper includes two implement scenario to cover diverse tags type. The protocol will ensure security and privacy of involved parties in the idle circumstances. Our comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more secure and practical than existing similar ones.
The major achievement of RFID technology can be achieved by offering the ability and possibility for a large scale automated data collection wirelessly.
There are three types of tags: active, semi-active and passive. The active tag includes a power source. The semi-active has a battery to store energy but requires to power on by a reader. The reader generates a radio frequency (RF) transmission to power on the passive tags which has no power source of its own. The tags transmission range and bandwidth will depend on many factors such as the type of the tag, tag manufacture and design, etc.
The passive tags are usually low-cost tags, used widely for low value products of our everyday life which requires moderate security. To make the passive tag more economic, it is very important to be able to use the tag more than once which require changing its ownership from one owner to another.
The tag ownership transfer is one of the key requirements for global implementation of networked RFID systems.
However many security and privacy threats might occur during the tag ownership transfer such as relay attacks, replay attacks, cloning, spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS), etc. These are serious concern for secure tag ownership transfer. In the recent years many security ownership transfer protocols attempt to deal with these threats which are discussed in details in section II. Hereby we are presenting a multi scenarios ownership transfer protocol based on a timer function in a closed loop system which is practical and secure.
Related Work
Many researchers worked on mutual authentication between tags and readers [3] [4] . However, the secure tag ownership transfer concept is newer and received less attention until recently when Osaka et al. [6] proposed a secure ownership protocol based on hash functions. Osaka was followed by other researchers who tried to propose improved version of [6] such as Wang et al. [7] and Jappinen [8] . However, [6, 7, 8] have de-synchronization problem [10] .
Also Song et al. [9] have proposed an ownership protocol which is based on tag identifiers using hash chains but it was proven weak against eavesdrop attack made by the previous owner during the transfer.
Chen et al. [11] proposed a three phase's one to one tag ownership transfer but the mutual authentication was proven weak against replay attack. Lin et al [12] also proposed a one to one ownership protocol which is weak at DoS and de-synchronization attacks.
Kapoor et al. [10] proposed a multi-tag and multiowner RFID ownership transfer protocol which uses a TTP (trusted third party) as a middleware this was protocol found to be suffering from DoS attack and de-synchronization attack. An attacker can change the random number in acknowledgement transmission from tag to TTP which will be discarded by TTP as it has incorrect value. This situation can potentially be used to generate a de-synchronization attack for a specific period of time which will lead to DoS attack. Doss, R et al. [4] proposed a secure tag ownership transfer protocol for closed loop system based on The Quadratic Residue property. It is also insecure against impersonation attack and DoS attack [3] .
Finally Ray et al. [3] proposed a secure mobile RFID ownership transfer protocol to cover all scenarios based on Diffie-Hellman secret Key exchange, although the protocol solved the windowing problem, however the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol itself was subject to weaknesses as suggested by Tang [5] . The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is vulnerable to Man-in-the-middle attack [6] that Ray et al.
protocol suggests it would prevent.
Our Proposed Protocol Details:
In this section, we detail the proposed protocol. We first detail initial setup which is followed by illustration and discussion of proposed protocol scenarios. For this discussion, we will use symbols detailed in Table 1 .
Our proposed protocol setup (for all scenarios) :
 All tags, readers will have Timing Synchronization Function (TYF) [13] called timer which uses reader ID ( ) as seed.
This timer is unique to a specific reader and always synchronized between reader ID and tag. The timer will be a secret changeable value in all transmissions. The change will depend on the owner request and protocol's requirement.
 The scheme will use a keyed hash function . The tag ID ( ) will be stored as in tag where ' ' is the timer.
The TID is known to the database server and it will store , and for every tag.  The tag will have two modes, the R (read) mode which is used for reading the tags details and the RW mode (read and write) which is used for ownership transfer.
Initially, all tags will be in the R mode. 
Our Proposed Scenario 1
This scenario has higher computational cost on tag compare to scenario 2. It requires less backward connection.
I. Mutual Authentication stage:
This stage will start when the tags (which are subject to the ownership transfer) will receive a request to set them up to the RW mode from the current owner reader 1 . The 1 will send from equation (1) to the tag. The is calculated from equation (1) where hashed is concatenated with . is calculated from equation (2) where value is
XORed with random number .
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Once the tag receive the hashed as well as , it verifies current reader's ID using its pre-store value. If the verification returns true then the tags will change its mode from R to RW mode.
The tag then retrieves K from equation (4) XORing hashed and as shown in equation (7).
Here the new owner's reader will compare the correctness of the transmission from the tag by verifying equality of . If then the mutual authentication stage will be successfully completed. Otherwise 2 will mark the tag as and send back to 1 for further investigation.
II. Ownership transfer stage:
After completing the mutual authentication stage, the new owner will generate new tag ID TID .Then it sends to the tag and request to execute write operation to change the TID. The is calculated from equation (8) where hashed is XORed with .
The tag retrieves as it knows using value on .
It then replaces its old with new which ends the ownership transfer. At this point forward only new owner can read the tag using .
Our Proposed Scenario 2
In this scenario the new owner DB2 starts the ownership transfer protocol when it sends its hashed reader ID to DB1 through the backend channel.
Once the current owner receives , the tags (which are subject to the ownership transfer) will receive a request to set them up to the RW mode from the current owner reader 1 . The 1 will send A Xored with to the tag. is calculated from equation (9) Once the tag receive the hashed as well as , it verifies current reader's ID using its pre-store value. If the verification returns true then the tags will change its mode from R to RW mode.
The tag then retrieves K from equation (12), and forward to the new owner reader by sending .
Is calculated in equation (11) where hashed tag ID is XORed with .
R1 will sends K to R2 via DB2 through the back end channel, here R2 will verify K received from both and DB1 if they were Identical R2 will send Confirmation and request TR1 from DB1 In case of transmission delay or incorrect , the reader discards all transmission. If the reader was unable to verify transmission from tag for second time it will mark the tag (unknown tag).
Once DB1 receives confirmation (OK) from R2 through DB2, DB1 will send TR1 to R2 through back end channel. The 2 will generate in equation (13) 
It then replaces its old with new which ends the ownership transfer. At this point forward only new owner can read the tag using .Then the tag will change its mode back to read only (R) after the last transmission.
Security Analysis
In both scenarios above we notice that the protocol is simple but effective at the same time, since the secret key Timer ( ) changes all the time it will be very hard to trace the TID by any malicious reader.
The captured information by eavesdroppers will be useless also because of randomness and changing nature of . The protocol will provide the following security measures: scenarios of the protocol ( see figure 2 and 3 ). In Table 2 (9) and (10) while the other values are also changeable for the next round as they all depend on the timer function. So recording and replaying previous rounds won't be successful. This will leads us to the conclusion that our proposed protocol will reduce the eavesdropping attacks to the minimum. Also the reader ID's will always be hashed during transmission and concatenated with 1 as shown in equation (1) and equation (9) 
